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Whereas the advantages of freehold are accepted for the rest of New 
Zealand, the same cannot be said of the High Country. Its multiple uses 
and sensitive nature are thought to require government's directing hand, 
with government control thought preferable to private control. However, 
political and bureaucratic processes do a very poor job of managing 
natural resources, and the High Country would be better managed for all 
uses if it were entirely in freehold and out of the reach of politicians and 
bureaucrats. 
With a bitter conflict now emerging over the use of the High Country, 
and with a new Land Act in the offing, perhaps the time is ripe to 
restate the argument that resources are best managed under a system of 
private property and free enterprise, and that rights to the High Country 
should not be subject to legislation and hence government control at all. 
High Country values are subjective values 
The case for freeholding requires that a great deal of muddled thinking 
be cleared away, and High Country values and the Protected Natural 
Areas Programme provide a good place to start. The PNA programme 
is a plan to survey the entire countryside, including the High Country, 
and identify and rank areas having nature conservation value. Other 
values, particularly ;:esthetic, spiritual and historic values, as well as 
1 
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recreational use, are also being noted.! The aim is to protect that land 
identified as having nature conservation value. "Following the initial 
phases of survey and data analysis, recommendations for protection 
contained in the survey reports must be implemented," and, "ultimately 
priority areas require security, preferably through central government 
legislation."Z 
The idea that land identified as having conservation value should be 
automatically protected is plain stupid. PNA surveys can compare 
different areas to assess their relative merit in telms of nature 
conselvation, but they cannot assign a value to nature conservation itself. 
They cannot tell whether the areas they identify as Priority Protected 
Places should be protected or not What ought to be done with a 
resource cannot logically be inferred from what the resource is. 3 The 
value of the natural features of the High Country is not something 
resource surveys can measure because this value derives not from the 
High Country itself but from the minds of individual people, and 
judgements will vary from person to person, and from time to time for 
the same person. High Country values are subjective values, not 
objective values; they derive not from the object, i.e. the High Country 
itself, but from the subject, i.e. the human valuer.4 A PNA report 
concluding that certain areas of land should be protected is drawing not 
solely upon the report's objective and quantitative survey of natural 
ITHE NEW ZEALAND PROTECTED NATURAL AREAS PROGRAMME: A SCIENTIFIC 
Focus 45 (G.c. Kelly & G.N Park ed. 1986). 
2Id. at 55-56. 
3The logical distinction between 'is' and 'ought' statements was recognised by 
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. I, § I, last para. (1739). 
4The rejection of objective theories of value, and their replacement with the 
subjective theory of value, along with marginal utility theory, distinguishes modern 
economics. The principal works are CARL MENGER, GRUNDSATZE DER VOLKSWIRTH-
SCHAFTSLEHRE (1871), WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY (1871), and LEON WALRAS, ELEMENTS D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE PURE 
(1874). 
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features, but upon someone's subjective preferences as well.5 
High Country values then are not inherent in the resource, but rather 
derive from the minds of individual people, and land use planning of 
logical necessity must have regard to subjective preferences and not just 
the High Country's natural features and ecological character. 
Resource allocation not the problem 
Another mistaken idea is that the problem the High Country presents is 
one of resource allocation. This idea follows from recognition of the 
High Country's multiple uses, diverse values and competing interests. For 
example, the Clayton Committee listed agriculture, recreation, habitat 
conservation, soil and water conservation, and the preserving of the 
balance of ecology, as competing interests, and noted that such a list was 
by no means exhaustive.6 In such fashion the problem is invariably 
construed as one of how to allocate High Country resources so as to 
achieve a good balance amongst these competing uses and interests. 
This, however, is emphatically not the problem. 
The problem is not one of how to allocate High Country resources but 
one of how to use information that is not given to anyone in its totality'? 
If all the relevant information about the use and potential use of the 
High Country were concentrated into one mind, and if this mind were 
given a set of preferences to satisfy, the allocation of the High Country 
would be but a matter of logic. However, the relevant information is not 
5See e.g., c.P. Brumley, M.W. Stirling, M.S. Manning, Old Man Ecological District: 
A Rapid Ecological Survey of Natural Areas for the New Zealand Protected Natural 
Areas Programme 2 (1986). 
6CROWN PASTORAL LEASES AND LEASES IN PERPETUITY, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY 9 (Wellington, 1982). 
7The information problem resource allocation presents, and the part prices play in 
solving it, were described by F.A Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. 
ECON. REV. 19 (1945). 
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concentrated in a single mind but is instead dispersed amongst the many 
minds of individual High Country users. This information is not of a 
specialist or scientific nature; rather, it is everyday information about 
particular circumstances of time and place. An example is the 
information the successful farmer has of the particular conditions and 
special circumstances of his farming enterprise. Another example is that 
special place for a group of trampers, with the relative value each assigns 
that place something only each individual can know. This is the 
information that is relevant in deciding High Country use, and it is 
information that cannot be concentrated into one mind or one group of 
minds. 
The problem the High Country presents is thus not how to allocate the 
resource amongst competing interests, but rather how to make use of the 
relevant information when it is not given to anyone mind in its totality. 
It is a problem of how to secure the best use of High Country resources 
known to New Zealanders, for ends whose relative importance only 
individual New Zealanders can know. 
Markets beat public administration 
The only way to make use of each individual's unique knowledge is to 
leave decisions depending upon that knowledge to the individual. The 
need for de centralised decision making is especially evident when it is 
considered that particular circumstances of time and place are not static 
but are constantly changing. Constant changes in farming conditions, for 
example, make it imperative that decisions be left to individual farmers. 
Rapid adaption to changing circumstances cannot possibly be achieved if 
all relevant information has to be communicated to a central office, 
which, after integrating all information, issues its orders. Decision making 
must be decentralised so that information about particular circumstances 
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of time and place can be promptly used. 
It is not enough, however, to have the "man on the spot" deciding solely 
on the basis of his limited but intimate knowledge of the facts of his 
immediate surroundings. The information that he needs to fit his 
decisions into the entire pattern of the changes of the larger economic 
system must be communicated to him. This is the part that price 
changes play; they convey in summary form just that information needed 
for people to co-ordinate their resource use. 
For example, imagine that somewhere in the world a new and valuable 
use for wool has arisen, or perhaps wool production has fallen because 
of bad weather. Wool is now scarcer. Wool users need to economise 
on wool and producers need to divert more resources to wool production. 
Such a result is brought about simply and effectively by the rise in price 
occasioned by the scarcity. And the effect rapidly spreads throughout the 
economic system as the price of wool products, and of the resources 
necessary to wool production, also rise, and so on. Noone oversees the 
entire system to organise the response; rather, people just make use of 
their own limited knowledge of their own particular circumstances of time 
and place, and the price system provides for overall co-ordination. 
Farmers responding to price changes are thus adjusting their plans so 
they better mesh with the plans of countless millions of individuals 
around the world. They are thereby working in with people and events 
of which they are not even aware, nor could be aware. In comparison, 
politicians and bureaucrats responding to political pressures and problems 
are but responding to those people and events of which they have 
immediate knowledge. It is simply untrue then that Crown ownership 
and public control of the High Country allows the preferences and 
THE FREEHOLD OPTION 6 
interests of a far greater number of people to be taken into account than 
do private ownership and private control. Indeed, the reason interest 
groups favour Crown ownership and public control is that it opens up 
opportunities for High Country use to be decided with reference to only 
a very narrow range of interests and with regard to only a few people's 
preferences. 
Private property ensures resource management 
The institution of private property allows the unique information that 
each individual has of particular circumstances of time and place to be 
put to good use. It does this by conferring upon individuals the authority 
to act, while at the same time rendering them responsible for their 
actions. The freehold farmer, for example, is free to use his land as he 
chooses, subject, of course, to his respecting his neighbours' property 
rights. The farmer's actions, in turn, are tempered by the system of 
profit and 10ss.8 In a free market the farmer's actions are 
unconditionally and totally subject to the sovereignty of the buying public, 
and profit and loss are generated by his success or failure in adjusting the 
course of his production activities to suit the most urgent demands of 
consumers. To survive he must provide a product that consumers want 
at a price they are both willing and able to pay. 
The position is quite different for politicians and bureaucrats. They are 
accountable not through the system of profit and loss, and hence to the 
daily and repeated decisions of consumers, but through the electoral 
system and the occasional decision of voters confronted with a quite 
limited choice. Public land therefore provides less public accountability 
than does private land, not more. 
SCt Ludwig von Mises, Profit and Loss, in PLANNING FOR FREEDOM 108 (4th ed. 
1980). 
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Sound resource management requires that property be not only private 
but also secure. Secure property is what allows people to plan their 
resource use. A farmer, for example, is able to plan his operation 
because he is reasonably sure of the resources he can call upon for his' 
purposes. Moreover, with his property secure he is encouraged to invest 
his profits back into his farm so he can better meet the demands of the 
public. Private property thus provides for prosperity by encouraging 
capital accumulation. Private property likewise encourages resource 
conservation because people husband resources if property in them is 
secure. For example, the freehold farmer conserves his soil confident 
that it is he who will benefit by his maintaining and improving the 
productivity and hence value of the asset. Were property insecure he 
would instead be encouraged to take as much out of the resource as he 
could.9 Secure property is thus a prerequisite for resource conservation. 
Secure property is essential also to the maintenance of peace and 
harmony. Neighbours are not at constant war over land because their 
respective rights are clearly delimited and respected. One need only 
consider the consequences of having boundary fences relocated every 
three years by political process to understand the important part private 
property plays in securing peace and harmony. As David Hume perhaps 
a little optimistically noted long ago: 
No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, 
and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most 
necessary to the establishment of human society, and that after the 
agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, there remains 
9Cf H.S. Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource, 62 J. PoL. 
ECON. 124 (1954); G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); S.N.S. 
Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the The01Y of a Non-exclusive Resource, 13 J. 
LAW & ECON. 49 (1970). 
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little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and 
concord.10 
Environmental entrepreneurs v. environmental activists 
People value the High Country not just for the meat and wool it can 
produce but also for its natural features and the recreational 
opportunities it affords. At present nature conservation and recreation 
are considered non-commercial uses, not because of the inherent nature 
of these uses, but because government has taken it upon itself to provide 
for them.ll Agriculture itself would be rendered a non-commercial use 
if it were taken over by a non-profit department of state. In contention 
is thus not how government should best provide for nature conservation 
and recreation, but whether government should be involved at all. 
For example, imagine an area of High Country land that nature lovers 
value for the native plants it supports, but which the leaseholder intends 
to overs ow and topdress. The clash of interests can be approached in 
either of two ways. The first is where the government shows itself ready 
to become involved in potential conflicts between conservation and 
development.12 Nature lovers are thereby encouraged to become 
environmental activists and lobby government to use its coercive powers 
to prevent the farmer from developing his land. The conflict will prove 
a bitter one as the farmer is unlikely to forgo the benefits of agricultural 
production, and more particularly, surrender his rights, without a fight.13 
The second approach is where government shows itself to be unwilling 
lOHume, supra note 3, at bk. III, pt. II, § II, para. 10. 
l1Ct Kenneth D. Goldin, Equal Access vs. Selective Access: A Critique of Public 
Goods Theory, 29 PUBLIC CHOICE 53 (1977). 
12Por a comment on a recent use of police power to take property on behalf of 
nature lovers, see Hide, Environmentalism vs. Property Rights, [Autumn] POLICY 53 
(1989l 
1 See e.g., Otago Daily Times, 6 December 1988, at 23. 
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to use its coercive powers to rearrange property in favour of one interest 
or another. Government instead confines the use of its coercive power 
to protecting people's property and leaves the rearrangement of property 
largely to private negotiation.14 Nature lovers are thereby encouraged 
to become environmental entrepreneurs. They are encouraged to 
organise and raise money, not to lobby government, but to pursue their 
interests through private negotiations. 
Nature lovers would be forced in consequence to confront the 
opportunity cost of their actions. Government would not take property 
rights on their behalf, and they would need to buy or otherwise negotiate 
for them. Nature lovers would thus come to know directly the value 
placed on land for other uses. Likewise farmers would come to know 
the value others place on their land for conservation and recreational 
uses. Moreover, areas of land valued for nature conservation and 
recreation would not be liabilities for farmers but assets and no doubt 
treated as such. The willingness of people to volunteer money for 
conservation and recreation would also indicate the relative value placed 
upon land for these uses. 
The greatest benefit, however, would be that the clash of interests would 
be resolved harmoniously. Environmental activists would not be able to 
pursue their interests at the expense of farmers. Forced transactions 
would be replaced by voluntary transactions in which both parties trade 
to their mutual advantage. No doubt also, with each party confronting 
the costs of their actions, much interest would be generated in innovative 
ways of reducing both the costs of agriculture and the costs of 
14Government by definition does have the power to force property transactions, as, 
for example, the raising of revenue through taxation. For an excellent discussion of the 
proper limits to this power, see RICHARD A EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
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conservation and recreation. Environmental entrepreneurs would playa 
key part in better co-ordinating the plans of all those who use the High 
Country, and thus in achieving true multiple use.15 
Land legislation politicises land use 
The main obstruction to having High Country use decided privately 
rather than politically is the belief that High Country land is somehow 
public land. For example, the Public Lands Coalition include pastoral 
leases with other Crown lands, and have as their primary goal "To retain 
all lands of important conservation and recreation value in Crown 
ownership with public control through central Government.,,16 Pastoral 
lease land is not public land, however, and it might more properly be 
described as private land in which the landholder's rights are attenuated 
and made subject to political interference. 
Pastoral lease land is private in the sense that lessees have exclusive 
rights to pasturage, they can refuse the general public access, and they 
have a perpetual right of renewa1.17 Pastoral lease land is political in 
that government may impose stock limitations, and uses other than 
pastoralism require government permission.18 
The original reason why pastoral lease land was not alienated was that 
a set price was administered for freehold land at the time of European 
occupation. 19 The price set for the High Country proved above the 
market price, and the colonial administrators, not wanting to freehold at 
I5Cf. ISRAEL M. KrRZNER, COMPETITION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973). 
I6public Land News, November 1988, at 4. 
I7Land Act 1948 s. 66(2). A lessee by definition has the right of exclusive 
possession, see HINDE, McMoRLAND & SIM, INTRODUCTION TO LAND LAW 229-31 (2d 
ed. 1986). 
I8Land Act 1948 ss. 66A, 66(3), 99-105, 106, 108. 
I9W.R. JOURDAIN, LAND LEGISLATION AND SETTLEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND 17-
20 (1925). 
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a "low" price, nor wanting to forgo the benefits of extensive pastoralism, 
established a system of pastoral licences.20 This was a mistake. They 
should have freeholded the land at whatever price the market offered. 
Pastoral licences were of short duration and included no right of renewal, 
thereby creating the incentive "to get in while the going was good." 
Beginning in the 1850s, stocking reached a peak about 1880, and 
subsequently declined. The decline over the next 70 years has been 
inferred for part of the High Country as in the order of 90%.21 
Although private landowners might have exploited the resource just as 
hard as licensees, they would at least have had every incentive to 
undertake rehabilitation as soon as technology and economic conditions 
made it worthwhile to do so. As it was, insecure tenure meant there was 
little incentive to husband the resource.22 
The Land Act 1948 specifically excluded from freeholding that High 
Country land considered by government and its advisors to be especially 
prone to erosion, and provided for that land the present pastoral 
leasehold system. The move from licence to perpetually renewable lease 
served to provide secure tenure.23 The land was excluded from the 
extensive freeholding provisions of the Act because being considered 
prone to erosion it was deemed to need government oversight.24 The 
thinking in New Zealand has always been that sound resource 
20Por history of pastoral licences in Canterbury, see L.G.D. ACLAND, THE EARLY 
CANTERBURY RUNS 21-30 (4th ed. 1975). 
21K.p. O'Connor, The Implications of Past and CWTent Developments to the 
Conservation of the South Island Tussock Grasslands, 5 N. Z. J. EcoL. 100 (1982). 
22Roy AL COMMISSION ON LAND SETTLEMENT, LAND TENURE, AND OTHER 
MATTERS AFFECTING THE CROWN LANDS OF THE COLONY, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 
II, C-4 AJ.H.R (1905). See, for example, submissions by B.E.H. Tripp at 42; G.!. 
Hamilton at 437; W.P. Hamilton at 438; G. Murray at 479; H.D. Acland at 508; D. 
Murchison at 511-12. See also the petition presented by B.E.H. Tripp at 1594. 
23Por the distinction between a licence and a lease, see HINDE, McMoRLAND & 
SIM, supra note 17, at 231. 
24284 N. Z. P ARL. DEB. 3999 (1948). 
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management requires government control and taxpayers' money. 
The Land Act 1948 provides for regulations and restrictions and thereby 
enables politicians and bureaucrats to control the High Country at the 
expense of the "man on the spot." Farming enterprises must in 
consequence be less efficient than they otherwise would be. The Land 
Act also renders uses other than pastoralism subject to government 
consent procedures and thus precludes the spontaneous development of 
multiple and alternative uses of land by entrepreneurs responding to 
public demand. The worst aspect of the Land Act, however, is that it 
politicises High Country land use and encourages organised coalitions to 
lobby government for policy and legislative changes that further their 
interests, i.e. it encourages nature lovers and outdoor enthusiasts to 
become environmental activists rather than environmental entrepreneurs. 
The Great Leap Backward 
Partly as a consequence of the resulting political demand for nature 
conservation and recreational use, and partly as a result of departmental 
restructuring, government is now planning a new Land Act.25 The 
intention is not to provide for conservation and recreation through 
entrepreneurial activity but rather through bureaucratic planning directed 
by new and expanded multiple use objectives.26 The new Bill is to 
require bureaucrats to take into account the natural, historical, cultural, 
recreation, and commercial values of the High Country,27 and the 
productive use of the land and the lessee's rights are to be balanced 
against the need for environmental protection in the interests of the 
25 Address to the North Canterbury High Country Section of Federated Farmers by 
Hon. Peter Tapsell, Minister of Lands, High Count1y Pastoral Leases and the Need for 
Natural Historic and Environmental Protection 2 (Mt White Station, 29 March 1989). 
26Id. at 5. 
27Id. 
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wider public.28 Control of the High Country is thus to shift further away 
from the "man on the spot," and there is to be provision for stock 
limitations on individual sections of land.29 Government has attempted 
to assure High Country people by telling them that it recognises its 
responsibilities to protect fairly the rights of lessees, and that it will not 
unnecessarily limit the commercial production of the land nor substantially 
reduce the rights of lessees.30 
Government has also proposed a land categorisation exercise splitting 
pastoral leasehold land into farmland, restricted use land, and 
conservation land.31 Farmland will be that land considered suitable for 
commercial productive use, and may become subject to a normal 
renewable lease with the right to freehold. Restricted use land will be 
that land considered to have significant natural or recreational or historic 
features and deemed to require public ownership but on which 
productive or other commercial uses on appropriate terms and conditions 
are considered compatible with the protection of those features. 
Conservation land will be that land considered to have no commercial 
farming value, or which is considered to require retiring from productive 
use in order to protect it from erosion or in order to protect 
predominant natural or historic features. This land will be transferred to 
the Department of Conservation. High Country people have been 
assured that results of the categorisation exercise will not be implemented 
without the agreement of the lessee.32 Presumably, the plan is to use 
taxpayers' money to buy High Country land in the interest of nature 
conservation and recreation. 
28Id. at 4. 
29Id. at 6. 
30Id. at 3-4. 
31Id. at 6-7. 
32Id. 
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The new Bill is also to provide for the granting of special use permits for 
activities not otherwise allowable on pastoral lease land.33 The consent 
granting process is to incorporate a process of public consultation similar 
to the Conservation Act.34 
Government's intention with the new Bill is to provide better for 
conservation.35 It is appropriate, therefore, to consider whether what is 
proposed will indeed achieve what it intends. The interests of 
conservation are certainly not served by government's move to qualify 
lessees' rights. Lessees' rights are now only to be fairly protected; they 
are to be reduced, although not substantially, whatever that may mean. 
Moreover, the rights of lessees are to be balanced against the interests of 
the wider public. Everything that nature lovers and outdoor enthusiasts 
value is now in consequence a liability for lessees. Whereas the present 
Act removes any incentive for lessees to provide for nature conservation 
and recreation, what is now proposed actually encourages lessees to 
destroy or otherwise diminish that which nature lovers and outdoor 
enthusiasts value. A lessee is not going to view native habitat as an asset 
but as a liability that could constrain farming operations. Any move that 
threatens people's property is a backward step and is counterproductive 
to the interests of conservation. 
The Bill is also a backward step in that the High Country is to be 
artificially split into commercial and non-commercial uses. Categorisation 
and consent procedures are to be the political and bureaucratic processes 
that will decide the balance. The categorisation exercise for its part will 
prove a costly extension to the Protected Natural Areas Programme. In 
addition to natural values, regard will be had to historical, cultural, 
33Id. at 8. 
34Id. at 9. 
35Id. at 2. 
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recreational, and commercial values. The exercise will prove of no more 
use to High Country planning than the PNA programme. Reports 
prepared to assess High Country 'values' and recommend land use will 
merely reflect their expert authors' idiosyncratic preferences, and the 
final carve-up itself will be decided by political clout. Nature 
conservation will thus depend upon the relative political power of 
commercial and non-commercial interests. A political contest that pits 
nature lovers and outdoor enthusiasts against farmers will do nothing to 
advance the interests of conservation. Such a contest will require nature 
lovers and outdoor enthusiasts to expend resources, not on conservation, 
but on lobbying government. Government for its part will have to devote 
considerable resources to categorising, administering, and managing the 
High Country. The money to be spent on the unnecessary bureaucracy 
that the proposed Bill will entail would no doubt be much better left in 
taxpayers' pockets to be spent on conservation projects of people's own 
choosing and under their direct control. 
The split between commercial and non-commercial uses also means that 
any chance of truly integrating conservation and development will be 
lost. The many slight adjustments to management that would provide 
true multiple use are only possible through private negotiations that force 
interested parties to have regard to the costs that their actions impose on 
others. Rather than land use being decided by countless fine adjustments 
in this way, the new Bill is to opt for bureaucratic prescription. Nature 
conservation, moreover, will be entirely dependent upon government 
command and taxpayers' money. Nature conservation will be something 
the government does and not something that private citizens need have 
regard to. Although the new Bill offers the prospect that environmental 
lobby groups will gain considerable power over the High Country, this 
does not equate to providing for resource conservation. Indeed, what is 
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proposed will not advance the interest of resource conservation at all; it 
is in fact a backward step. 
Depoliticising the High Country 
It would be much better for conservation if the High Country were in 
freehold. This could be largely accomplished by selling all existing 
pastoral lease land to lessees at a price commensurate to present rentals. 
The price could be calculated by adjusting for inflation the annual rental 
paid on a lease for the past five years, calculating the average rental, and 
then capitalising the average using a discount rate of, say, 10%.36 For 
example, the inflation adjusted annual average rental for a lease taken 
over the past five years might be $1000, which, capitalised at 10%, 
provides a freeholding price of $10,000. 
Such a price is not absurdly low, as might at first be thought. The value 
of pastoral lease land has been all but capitalised into the lease. Anyone 
buying a pastoral lease has in effect been buying freehold rights, and the 
prices paid have reflected this fact. The lessees' situation is no different 
to some homeowners in Christchurch whose sections are held in 999 year 
leases for an annual rental of $1. The price paid for these sections is 
exactly that which would be paid if they were in fee simple. The rental 
the homeowners pay cannot be reasoned to be absurdly low and it would 
be ridiculous to pay much above $10 to convert the title from leasehold 
to fee simple. The same reasoning applies to pastoral leases. Lessees 
would simply be freeholding their land by paying government their future 
rental by way of a lump sum. In so doing they would also be 
safeguarding their property from political and bureaucratic interference, 
and for this lessees should not have to pay. 
36Cf: Steve H. Hanke, On Privatizing the Public Domain, in PRIVA1E RIGHTS AND 
PUBLIC LANDS 85 (Phillip N. Truluck ed. 1983). 
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The advantage of freeholding lies in the improved resource allocation 
and management that would result. Freeholding cannot be treated as a 
revenue generating device by government because major strands of the 
bundle of rights that comprise freehold title are already held by lessees. 
Freeholding conservation land will prove a more difficult task. Ideally 
the land at present owned by the Crown and managed by the 
Department of Conservation should be converted to freehold title and 
divided up amongst private groups such as the Federated Mountain 
Clubs, the Royal Forest and Bird Society, the New Zealand Deerstalkers' 
Association, and the Acc1imatisation Societies. The land should be 
turned over to these groups for free. Nature lovers and outdoor 
enthusiasts would then have direct control of conservation land. Those 
they charge with resource management would be directly accountable to 
the membership because the membership would be paying their salaries. 
Environmental pressure groups would thus be transformed into resource 
management agencies. They would be able to care for the land as they 
best see fit, subject, of course, to respecting the rights of their 
neighbours. They could buy and sell land to further their interests, and, 
more particularly, they could sell land over which they retain an easement 
to ensure the protection of that which they value, and they could likewise 
negotiate easements over private land owned by others. True multiple 
use would thus be made possible. Moreover, nature lovers and outdoor 
enthusiasts would have authority to decide the management of High 
Country land and would be responsible for their decisions as the costs of 
their actions would fall on them and not on other land owners or 
taxpayers. 
However, freeholding conservation land could prove difficult because 
under present arrangements environmental organisations have had very 
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little resource management experience. It would perhaps be best if they 
were initially supported with staff and funds from the Department of 
Conservation. It would be important, however, to have a plan for the 
eventual complete removal of government and taxpayers' funds from the 
management of the South Island High Country. 
Conclusion 
Much has been made over the years of the public interest in pastoral 
lease land. Agricultural production and soil conservation were once in 
the public interest. Government was then prepared to assist farmers. 
Circumstances have changed. Nature conservation is now in the public 
interest. Government is now prepared to assist nature lovers and 
outdoor enthusiasts. It is about time we realised that the use of 
government's coercive powers to further special interests is always 
inimical to the public interest. The public interest is only served when 
government confines the use of its coercive powers to protecting people's 
property.37 
37Cf. Hume, supra note 3, at bk. III, pt. II, § II, para. 20. 
